I consider utilitarianism to be a narrow standard, because eventhough lots of different things have impacts to wellbeing, the standard assumesthat consequences (in terms of wellbeing) are all that matters. Deontological standardsthat exclude all consequences are also narrow standards. The default framework,I think, should be a wide framework according to which consequences matter, butare not all that matters.
Some would object to this view on the grounds that a standardmust be either exclusively ends-based or exclusively means-based.
I believe this claim originated as a theory argument ("PhilSpec") in 2007. Since then, it has grown into a kind of conventionalwisdom. I'm not sure whether people accept it because they mistakenly thinkthat non-consequentialists don't care about consequences; they seem toreinforce each other. I have also heard people justify this view on thegrounds that a wide framework, which considers both ends and means, orleaves their prioritization an open question, can't sufficiently weigh impacts.That would be bad because it prevents your opponent from impacting offense toyour standard, and because it makes the judge unable to decide the roundobjectively.
I don't share those worries because the same debates aboutends-versus-means happen. They become weighing arguments. The upshot is thatthe opponent can impact offense to your standard just as well, and the judgecan use the standard to evaluate impacts, with the impacts' weight being determinedby philosophical argument.
Under the view that a standard must be exclusively ends-based ormeans-based, the vast majority of non-consequentialist views (and many of themost plausible ones, in my opinion) would be excluded. If you share my viewthat LD framework debate is only valuable because of the opportunity to learnhow to argue about and apply philosophy, then this is a bad result. Themeans-ends dichotomy also seems to exclude virtue-based considerations aboutthe agent's dispositions. (You can, in principle, translate thoseconsiderations into means- or ends-based ideas. But, just like"consequentialized" translations of deontological theories, theresulting view may not be the most plausible version, so why assume it's wrongat the outset?) The norm against wide frameworks also excludes value pluralism,Rossian deontology, and commonsense morality.
You might think, though, that even if there is comparison goingon, a wide framework is just too complicated to work. In a short debate round,we have to simplify things and ignore considerations that are otherwiserelevant to questions of applied ethics and public policy. But, first, whileit's true that we tolerate oversimplification, westill favor accuracy: although debaters are free to make sweeping,implausible claims about the world, those claims lose against specific evidencethat shows a more accurate (and usually more complex) picture. And, second, LDdebaters utilized wide frameworks for years, and judges regularly decidedrounds (with debaters' approval) using two different standards. Narrow,preclusive standards have been around as long as I've been debating, but theidea that standards must be preclusive and must beexclusively means- or ends-based is a recent development. The reason for itspopularity has more to do with its strategic advantages than with its truth orwith the incoherence of its alternative.