By: Jerry Chen
Fairness: a word we've all heard one time too often in therounds we've debated or judged. Given the mass proliferation of theory on thenational circuit in recent years, it seems like more and more rounds these daysare decided on the theory layer, often to the exclusion of substantive andtopical debate (although that’s a different issue altogether). Everyone isfamiliar with the voter of fairness; most judges paradigmatically assume that itis important in some sense- but to what degree? What exactly does it mean to befair, and what implications does fairness have for debate? Let’s consult ourfavorite dictionary…
fair :
adjective
1. free from bias, dishonesty, or injustice: a fair decision; a fair judge
2. legitimately sought, pursued, done, given, etc.; proper under the rules: a fair fight
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/fair?s=t
Let’s start from the first definition. In the context of adebate round, judges are presumed to be unbiased, since their job is todetermine the better debater. The problem, then, seems to arise when the roundis such that the judge is unable to make an objective evaluation, even if theywanted to. This is the usual justification for the fairness voter in a theoryshell- the judge's highest priority is to be an impartial adjudicator. This iswhere the second definition of fair comes into play- how do we determine whatit means to be fair? What exactly are the rules of debate?
Most debaters and judges seem to assume that fairness isequal access to winning the ballot (at least, that’s how it’s generallydefined). Practices such as judge intervention and necessary-but-insufficientburdens are decried as some of the most egregious violations of fairness, sincethey supposedly prevent equal access to the ballot. Given the trends in thecommunity for the past couple of years, it seems like at least a couple ofthese arguments have solidified into norms, eg. a priori/pre-standards argumentshave largely died out as common practices, since they have stopped winning asmany rounds as they have in the past. However, winning the ballot, in thecontext of fairness, seems relatively arbitrary- although "unbiased",judges have a wide range of personal preferences. In the vast majority ofcases, one cannot expect to have a 100% "tab" judge. Some judges voteon skeptical arguments and tricks, while others rule them out entirely. Thosejudges would also still probably vote off pre-standards arguments and the likeif they were dropped. If that is the case, it doesn't seem “fair” thatdifferent judges make different decisions given the same kind of arguments,relatively regardless of what the debaters do in the round. Moreover, there areexternal considerations such as the resources that one has at his or herdisposal. The ability to prep or have multiple coaches is heavily skewedthroughout the circuit, often disadvantaging small schools. With all this inmind, the first problem arises: what do we do with fairness? Here’s an analogy.Think of your classic util vs. deont debate. Let's assume that fairness isvaluable. Is it something we have to maximize, or is it simply aside-constraint?
In most debate rounds, debaters have empirically preferred autilitarian approach. Most obviously, in the case where both debaters havereasonably legitimate claims that their opponent is being abusive, theintuitive (and common) solution seems to be to determine who is comparativelymore abusive, or unfair- and in most of these cases, that is how judges end upevaluating the round. But if we take this idea to its fullest logical extent,it seems like that would imply that we could just flip a coin or use a randomnumber generator to determine the winner. Now, the objection I imagine mostwould think of is that, flipping a coin would not determine the better debater,and that debate would require some kind of substantive clash. But above, we'vealready determined that being the better debater is quite arbitrary and that argumentationdoesn't always matter, especially if a judge paradigmatically excludes certainarguments. So, that objection doesn't sound particularly strong in the face ofjudges who could plausibly reject a multitude of different types ofargumentation. Moreover, even if we wouldn’t flip a coin with that logic inmind, the problem still remains- if competitive equity is something we ought tomaximize, then we would still be logically obligated to take extreme measures.Should we err on the side of small school debaters because they aredisadvantaged in terms of resources? This seems intuitively unappealing, andalso unfair. But more importantly, where is the cutoff for the practices wemust endorse or promote to make sure rounds are the most fair? A maximizationmodel of fairness, thus, is questionable.
Does this mean we ought to treat fairness as a constraint?This view also seems unpalatable, because the theory debate looks irresolvablewhen both debaters have some claim to a violation of fairness. A reasonablesolution might be to assume some kind of act-omission distinction in evaluatingfairness. In this way, there is no reason to maximize fairness to the extremedegree of flipping a coin, but given multiple violations of fairness, it isstill possible to weigh comparatively worse violations. I do not have a clearanswer to this problem.
However, a secondary problem remains. Let us assume thatwe’ve figured out if we want to maximize fairness or simply treat it as aconstraint. The question remains as to what the rules of debate ought to be inthe first place. Think back to the argument about small schools beingdisadvantaged. It would definitely help equalize the playing field, and thusaccess to the ballot, if we favored them in some way or another. I’ve heardarguments along the lines of “err on the side of small schools on theorydebates”, or something to that effect. But once again, taking into accountconsiderations external to the issues brought up in the debate round isintuitively unfair and antithetical to determining the better debater. Debateis an esoteric activity that is also to a large extent, based on privilege- butdoes that mean we ought to factor that into the way rounds are adjudicated? Obviously,we should be proactive in making debate more accessible to all (again, adifferent but very relevant and important discussion). But at first glance, itdoesn’t seem “fair” to punish debaters from bigger schools just because theywere lucky enough to be in that position in the first place.
The idea of fairness also seems to imply a factor of“culpability”. Some scholars[1]have written on the idea of fairness in game theory when applied to sports; forexample, violations such as handballs and slide tackling in soccer earn playerspenalties. In debate, people run towards the penalty of “dropping the debater”to gain a strategic advantage (for the most part), without often assessingculpability. Specifically, this is especially apparent in claims of “timeskew”, in the sense that the affirmative is time crunched between two, longernegative speeches. However, if we take culpability into account, it seems thatthe negative has no control over the speech times, or structural rules ofdebate. Moreover, debaters debate a roughly equal amount of rounds on bothsides, so why should one debater be punished to compensate the other for somethingneither has control over? This issue also spills over to the previous issue Ihave discussed- a common response to the objection to time skew is that westill ought to balance the round even if it’s out of the debaters’ hands. Butthen, it still seems arbitrary where we draw the line- to what extent do wehave to try to make the round more equitable or balanced? To that, I have noreal answer- this discussion is only the beginning of a much largerconversation over a very abstract topic that is nevertheless pervasive in manyof the debates taking place these days on the circuit. What are your thoughts?
[1] Sigmund Loland, Professor, Norwegian University ofSport and Physical Education, “Justice and Game Advantage in Sporting Games,Ethical Theory and Moral Practice”, Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1999.