In Defence of Moral Error Theory

Moral error theorists typically accept two claims - one conceptual and one ontological - about moral facts. The conceptual claim is that moral facts are or entail facts about categorical reasons (and correspondingly that moral claims are or entail claims about categorical reason); the ontological claim is that there are no categorical reasons-and consequently no moral facts-in reality. I accept this version of moral error theory and I try to unpack what it amounts to in section 2. In the course of doing so I consider two preliminary objections that moral error theory is (probably) false because its implications are intuitively unacceptable (what I call the Moorean objection) and that the general motivation for moral error theory is self-undermining in that it rests on a hidden appeal to norms. | Direct Link to PDF

Moral Minds: The Nature of Right and Wrong

THE CENTRAL IDEA of this book is simple: we evolved a moral instinct, a capacity that naturally grows within each child, designed to generate rapid judgments about what is morally right or wrong based on an unconscious grammar of action. Part of this machinery was designed by the blind hand of Darwinian selection millions of years before our species evolved; other parts were added or upgraded over the evolutionary history of our species, and are unique both to humans and to our moral psychology. These ideas draw on insightsfrom another instinct: language. | Direct Link to PDF (e-book)

Oxford Studies in Metaethics

The full book is available online for free:Oxford Studies in Metaethics is designed to collect, on an annual basis, some of the best new work being done in the field of metaethics. I’m very pleased to be able to present this third volume, one that has managed so successfully to fulfill the aims envisioned for the series. | Direct Link to Book

Moral Judgment

i. Moral rules are held to have an objective, prescriptive force; they are notdependent on the authority of any individual or institution.ii. Moral rules are taken to hold generally, not just locally; they not only proscribebehavior here and now, but also in other countries and at other times in history.iii. Violations of moral rules involve a victim who has been harmed, whose rightshave been violated, or who has been subject to an injustice.iv. Violations of moral rules are typically more serious than violations ofconventional rules. | Direct Link to PDF

Boredom? ADHD?

John Plotz in the New York Times: Their Noonday Demons, and Ours

These days, when we try to get a fix on our wasted time, we use labels that run from the psychological (distraction, “mind-wandering” or “top-down processing deficit”) to the medical (A.D.H.D., hypoglycemia) to the ethical (laziness, poor work habits). But perhaps “acedia” is the label we need. After all, it afflicted those whose pursuits prefigured the routines of many workers in the postindustrial economy. Acedia’s sufferers were engaged in solitary, sedentary, cerebral effort toward a clear final goal — but a goal that could be reached only by crossing an open, empty field with few signposts. The empty field is the monk’s day of spiritual contemplation in a cell besieged by the demon acedia — or your afternoon in a coffee shop with tiptop Wi-Fi.

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Obama/Clinton?

Nobel Prize winner and former US Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich, makes the case for the "natural" Obama/Clinton ticket in 2012:

Why do I say this? Because Obama needs to stir the passions and enthusiasms of a Democratic base that’s been disillusioned with his cave-ins to regressive Republicans. Hillary Clinton on the ticket can do that.

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The Boundaries of Justice

The overarching concern in the idea of justice is the need to have just relations with others—and even to have appropriate sentiments about others; and what motivates the search is the diagnosis of injustice in ongoing arrangements. In some cases, this might demand the need to change an existing boundary of sovereignty—a concern that motivated Hume’s staunchly anti-colonial position. (He once remarked, “Oh! How I long to see America and the East Indies revolted totally & finally.”) Or it might relate to the Humean recognition that as we expand trade and other relations with foreign countries, our sentiments as well as our reasoning have to take note of the recognition that “the boundaries of justice still grow larger,” without the necessity to place all the people involved in our conception of justice within the confines of one sovereign state.

Amartya Sen, in The National Review, "The Boundaries of Justice."

What Position Will Win the TOC?

First, I just want to give a shout-out to the Mountain Brook tournament in Birmingham. This is the second year I've been, and once again the hospitality and timeliness have been exceptional. Jeff Roberts really goes out of his way to bring good judges to the tournament and put on a good show (and the MB students do a great job keeping things running). If you live in the South and don't make it to this tournament, you're missing out!On to the substance of today's post: what position will win the TOC?

I'll try not to answer my own question (since I'm more interested in others' thoughts), but I will say this: debaters are doing themselves a strategic disservice by running away from the plausibly true positions on this topic. I describe the loss as a "strategic" one, because I'm reasonably certain that no one will be persuaded by pedagogical risks.

The debates that start off on dubious premises (thanks to ridiculous case positions) almost always become side-tracked by theoretical and procedural questions that can rarely be resolved predictably. This is especially true in elimination rounds against strong competitors—the marginal utility of a "non-stock" position is significantly diminished when assured that your opponent will either shift the debate to theory or respond with an even more "outside the box" argument. The race to the bottom of absurdity can quickly become a counterproductive exercise, or one that at best terminates in a coin-flip decision.

While I hesitate to make any predictions, I certainly hope that high-level debates will explore the contextually unique accounts of self-defense that tend to permeate this topic in real-world discussion. I believe that the most researched account of this issue can and should take center stage. Off-the-wall positions may be decisive in prelims and lesser tournaments, but the most consistently and universally successful positions are true ones.

What do you expect to see come out on top?

Three Judging Practices That Need To Stop by Adam Torson

All of these practices are tempting, but a moment’s reflection should suggest to most judges that they are inappropriate.

1. Speaker Point Games

Enough with the paradigms that promise increased speaker points for goofy behavior. You might think it’s hysterical to promise a thirty for bringing you a cookie, saying “supercalifragilisticexpialidocious,” or dancing a jig, but it’s not. Judging is not about you – the debaters aren’t there for your entertainment.

If it were harmless fun nobody would care, but speaker points matter. They affect who you debate in prelims (especially later in a tournament when brackets are smaller), whether you break, and out-round seeding. On more than one occasion I have seen a speaker point game change who breaks and who doesn’t. It’s not fair, and it should stop.

2. Berating Debaters

A certain amount of irritation at poorly debated rounds is natural, but it’s stunning how often judges go way over the top. Expressing outrage at the state of debate or the obnoxiousness of some particular practice may be cathartic, but it’s hardly constructive. Getting angry and berating debaters is self-indulgent; the oral critique is not about your anger. It is reprehensible to be proud of making a debater cry.

Sometimes anger is appropriate, as when a debater is rude or patently offensive, but this is relatively rare. Yelling at someone because they made an argument you don’t like suggests a dramatic lack of perspective – the kids are learning what a good argument is, people have different views on what a good argument is, and students are coached in different ways. The RFD is not about showing off how smart you are or how much you know about debate. Get over yourself and make your comments constructive. You are not entitled to adjudicate a tournament full of mistake free rounds.

3. Calling Tons of Evidence

Everyone seems to want debaters to be clearer, but many of us engage in a practice that incentivizes exactly the opposite. The debaters’ opportunity to effectively convey the meaning of their evidence is the constructive. Figuring out what evidence means after the round and making it part of the decision calculus is blatant intervention. There are judges who routinely call virtually every argument read in the round and reconstruct their flow on that basis. Give me a break.

I suspect this is mostly motivated by ego – none of us likes to admit that we didn’t understand an argument. But – I feel like a broken record – it’s not about you. It is unfair and pedagogically unsound to vote for arguments you straight up don’t understand – even more so when you are doing things like supplying evidence comparison for the debaters. Have enough courage to admit when you don’t get something, even at the risk of teenagers thinking you’re not as smart as they otherwise would.